🔒 What does Friendstime protect — and what not?
We won't promise you "everything is 100 % encrypted" — that wouldn't be honest. We tell you exactly which data is end-to-end encrypted, which the server can read, and what encryption technically cannot hide.
🗺️What is encrypted where and how?
As of 18 Nov 2026, checked against the code and server settings. "Post-quantum hybrid" means: a classical method (X25519) and a post-quantum method (ML-KEM) are combined. Protection holds as long as either of the two remains unbroken – an extra safety margin, not a guarantee.
| Area | Protection | Who can read it? | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
One-to-one chats (text) |
Post-quantum hybrid: X25519 + ML-KEM-768, combined with HKDF-SHA256, content AES-256-GCM. Mandatory: the server does not accept other formats. |
Only you and the other person |
✅ active |
Group chats |
The group key is wrapped for each member using post-quantum hybrid. If a member lacks the hybrid key, nothing is sent. Groups that were never encrypted remain plain text. |
Only the members or participants |
✅ active if everyone involved is up to date |
Photos, voice messages, files |
Content AES-256-GCM, key wrapped per recipient using post-quantum hybrid. |
Only you and the other person |
✅ active if everyone involved is up to date |
Calls (one-to-one and group) |
Audio and video end-to-end (AES-GCM), call key exchanged using post-quantum hybrid. If someone cannot do hybrid, only transport encryption remains – with a visible notice. Live captions and the in-call chat are not end-to-end encrypted. |
Only the members or participants |
✅ active if everyone involved is up to date |
Live location |
Positions AES-256-GCM, key wrapped using post-quantum hybrid. Without hybrid, nothing is shared. |
Only you and the other person |
✅ active |
Moments and places |
Wrapped using post-quantum hybrid (X25519 + ML-KEM-768), content AES-256-GCM. |
Only the members or participants |
✅ active if everyone involved is up to date |
Vault and private notes |
Encrypted on the device with AES-256-GCM, key wrapped using post-quantum hybrid. Shared vault links: AES-256-GCM, the key is only in the link. Older plain-text notes are encrypted when opened. |
Only you; for shared links: whoever has the full link |
✅ active |
Moving to a new device |
Post-quantum hybrid with ML-KEM-1024 + X25519; only this version is accepted. |
Only you (your devices) |
✅ active |
Your private keys (stored on the server) |
Protected by your password (AES-256-GCM). However, the envelope around the post-quantum keys still uses RSA-2048 (classical); a purely symmetric envelope is currently being tested with test accounts. |
Only you (your devices) |
⚠️ partly classical |
Notifications (push) |
Our own push service, no vendor services. The app fetches content per device encrypted with post-quantum hybrid; browsers and older apps via TLS. Notifications for encrypted messages contain no content. |
Our server (operator) |
✅ active |
Hiding the sender (sealed sender) |
Post-quantum hybrid; the sender proof uses Ed25519 (classical). So far only for test accounts. |
Concerns metadata, not content |
🕓 gradual (test accounts) |
Connection browser/app ↔ server |
TLS 1.3 with the hybrid key exchange X25519MLKEM768 (older browsers: classical X25519). The internal forwarding to the web host uses classical TLS. |
Our server (operator) |
⚠️ partly classical |
Call relay (TURN over TLS) |
Classical TLS 1.2 (X25519). Audio and video inside are additionally encrypted; switching to hybrid is planned. |
Concerns metadata, not content |
⚠️ classical only |
Posts, profiles, comments |
Stored readable on the server (TLS in transit). End-to-end encryption for posts to friends is built but not yet switched on. |
Our server (operator) |
⏸ not yet on |
Recordings (livestream/call) |
Only with consent. Stored on the server; AES encryption is being introduced; deleted after 24 hours. No end-to-end encryption. |
Our server (operator) |
🔧 in progress |
Emails |
TLS (classical) when sent. In the mailbox, emails are stored with the respective email provider. |
Our server and the email providers involved |
⚠️ classical only |
Database and backups |
Account and profile data, posts and metadata are readable by the server; individual fields (e.g. IBAN, two-factor secrets) are additionally encrypted. Database backups: X25519 (classical). |
Our server (operator) |
⚠️ partly classical |
Metadata |
Who communicates with whom, when and how much is needed by the server for delivery – this cannot be encrypted. |
Our server (operator) |
⚠️ visible |
Signatures and safety numbers |
Classical (Ed25519). There is no post-quantum signature method yet. |
Concerns authenticity, not reading |
⚠️ classical only |
🛡️What is protected?
The short, honest overview (as of 9 Nov 2026, based on the code and server settings). "Conditional" means: only if everyone involved uses a current app or the web messenger. Details are below.
| Data | Status |
|---|---|
|
Text of private chats
Text messages between two accounts: hybrid scheme X25519 + ML-KEM-768 with AES-256-GCM. The server now accepts new encrypted one-to-one messages only in this hybrid format (mandatory) and rejects older formats. If a message cannot be sent as hybrid (for example because the other person has not updated the app yet), the web messenger sends nothing. The server sees sender, recipient, time and size
|
✅ End-to-end |
|
Text of group chats
Encrypted groups use a group key (epochs) with the hybrid scheme; every member needs the hybrid part, otherwise the group is blocked and plain text is rejected as well. If a group is or has been encrypted, the server rejects plain text. Groups that were never encrypted can still be used without encryption
|
✅ conditional |
|
Voice messages, images, videos, files in one-to-one chats
End-to-end encrypted (AES-256-GCM, the key is wrapped per recipient with the hybrid scheme X25519 + ML-KEM-768) when both accounts have hybrid keys and use a current app or the web messenger. The old unencrypted path for voice messages is blocked. Media in group chats follow the rules of the group (see above). The server sees sender, recipient, time and size, not the content
|
✅ conditional |
|
Calls (video and audio)
On the web, calls (one-to-one and in groups) are end-to-end encrypted when all participants support the hybrid scheme; the key is exchanged with the hybrid scheme. If the other side cannot, encryption in transit only remains and you get a notice. This applies on the web and in the app (version 5.57.768 or later). Chat and reactions in the call data channel as well as live streams are not end-to-end encrypted. The server sees participants, duration and room
|
🕓 In stages |
|
Call captions
Live captions pass through our server in plain text and are not end-to-end encrypted, even if the call itself is. They are stored briefly and deleted after about 60 seconds. The server sees the caption text
|
❌ No E2EE |
|
Live location in one-to-one chats
Positions are end-to-end encrypted (hybrid wrapping, AES-256-GCM). Older shares without hybrid are no longer extended. The server sees who shares with whom, for how long and when
|
✅ conditional |
|
Places and moments in chat
End-to-end encrypted with hybrid wrapping (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) when the people involved support hybrid. The server sees the pair, the time and the size
|
✅ conditional |
|
Vault files (link)
Encrypted in the browser with AES-256-GCM; the key is in the part of the link after the #, which the browser does not send to the server. Anyone with the full link can open the file. For storage in your account a hybrid envelope (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) is added. The server sees file size, time and owner
|
✅ End-to-end |
|
Posts for friends only
End-to-end encryption for posts to friends, close friends or private is built but not switched on yet (it is waiting for the moderation keys). Until then these posts are stored readable on the server
|
⏸ Not on yet |
|
Moving to a new device
Moving the keys to a new device uses ML-KEM-1024 + X25519. Under the hybrid requirement only this new version is accepted, so both devices must be up to date. The server sees the pairing process and the time
|
✅ conditional |
|
Hiding the sender (sealed sender)
Being rolled out step by step (test accounts first, then 10%, 50% and 100% of accounts, each only while delivery is error-free); not active for everyone yet. Where it is active, the server stores the message without a sender entry; recipient, time and size remain visible
|
🕓 In stages |
|
Connection to the website (TLS)
Between the browser and our front server the connection uses TLS 1.3 with the hybrid key exchange X25519MLKEM768 (older browsers: X25519). The leg from the front server to the web host uses classic TLS (without a post-quantum part). The front server and the web host process requests like any web server; E2EE content stays encrypted
|
⚠️ Partly |
|
Metadata
Who messages whom, when (needed for delivery)
|
⚠️ Visible to server |
|
Public content
Posts, profiles, groups, comments
|
❌ No E2EE |
|
Private notes about contacts
Encrypted on your device (AES-256-GCM, key X25519 + ML-KEM-768 to your own account); the server only stores the encrypted content. Notes from older app versions are encrypted the next time you open them.
|
✅ Post-quantum hybrid |
|
IP address
When you visit via Tor (.onion), our server does not learn it — otherwise it does
|
✅ Optional (Tor) |
|
Passwords
Not stored in plain text but as a hash (Argon2id, partly with an additional server-side secret); older bcrypt hashes are upgraded at the next login
|
✅ hashed |
🔒 Private chats — text is end-to-end encrypted
The text of your private messages is encrypted on your device and only becomes readable again on the recipient’s; the server then stores nothing but ciphertext. The hybrid scheme is mandatory for new encrypted one-to-one messages: the server only accepts messages that carry a hybrid package (X25519 + ML-KEM-768). It cannot verify that the classical part was really mixed in on the device — it only sees the label in the package. If a message cannot be sent as hybrid, the web messenger does not fall back to an older path: it sends nothing and the text stays in the input field. Your private key is stored on the server in encrypted form and is unlocked on your device with a key derived from your password — so the security of your chats depends on the strength of your password.
The notification for an encrypted message contains no excerpt of the text, only a note such as 🔒 Encrypted message — the server cannot produce an excerpt because all it holds is ciphertext.
Methods: one-to-one text — key exchange with X25519 and the post-quantum scheme ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203), combined with HKDF-SHA256, content encrypted with AES-256-GCM. "Hybrid" means two independent schemes are combined, in case one of them is broken later. That is an extra safety margin, not a free pass against future attacks. For media, places, moments, live location and vault the keys are wrapped per recipient on the same principle (SHA3-256 combiner with context binding); moving to a new device adds ML-KEM-1024. The computing cores come from the Rust library libcrux (web: WebAssembly with a JavaScript fallback; app: JNI). The key belongs to your account, not to a single device: after signing in with your password, each of your devices can decrypt your chats. There has been no independent review (audit) of the encryption so far.
🌐 Public content — deliberately not E2EE
Posts, profiles, groups and comments are meant to be public and are stored readable on the server. That is not end-to-end encryption — and we say so honestly. It is technically necessary for feed, search and moderation to work at all.
Rule of thumb: if others are meant to see it, the server can see it too. What should truly stay private belongs, as text, in a private one-to-one chat.
🧾 Metadata — what E2EE does not hide
End-to-end encryption protects the content, but not the routing metadata. To deliver a message, the server has to know who communicates with whom and when. This "who-with-whom-when" information is technically unavoidable — we don't hide that.
For end-to-end encrypted messages, the server holds the content only as ciphertext. The server stores sender, recipient, time, size and type of the message in readable form. For the hybrid requirement it also keeps a short log (who to whom, when, web or app, one-time ID) that is cleaned up after 14 days. Sealed sender can take the sender out of the message store in future, but it is not active for everyone yet.
🧅 Network privacy — Tor (.onion)
For anyone who wants to use it, Friendstime is additionally reachable as an onion service on the Tor network (.onion). When you visit via the onion address, Friendstime does not learn your IP address, and your internet provider does not see which site you are visiting. Some features contact further servers — for example card payments, embedded videos, calls and livestreams; these connections leave the onion service.
This only applies when you open Friendstime in the Tor Browser. Over a normal connection the server knows your IP address — as with any website. Tor hides where you are coming from — not who you are once you sign in to your account. The Android app has no built-in Tor mode.
⚠️ Known limits
These are the points we see as weaknesses ourselves:
- Your private keys are stored on our server, protected by your password. The envelope for them still uses RSA-2048; a change to a symmetric envelope is planned.
- The server cannot verify whether the classical X25519 part was really mixed into a message; it only sees the label in the package.
- Groups that were never encrypted can still be used without encryption.
- Sharing files from other apps into the Friendstime app is still without end-to-end encryption until the next app version.
- Signatures and safety numbers (the key comparison) still use classical methods, not the hybrid scheme.
- Notifications are delivered by our own push service; Google FCM and browser vendors' web push are switched off. The app fetches content per device encrypted with post-quantum hybrid, browsers and older apps via TLS. Notifications for encrypted messages contain no content; other types (e.g. calls) may contain names.
- Server backups (off-site database backup) currently use only a classical method (X25519), not hybrid.
- There has been no independent audit so far.
🐞Found a security vulnerability?
If you discover a vulnerability in Friendstime, please report it to us confidentially through our reporting form — even without an account. It also explains how we handle reports.
❓Frequently asked questions
Is Friendstime end-to-end encrypted?
In part, and this page says exactly what is. End-to-end encrypted (under the conditions in the table): the text of private one-to-one chats with the hybrid scheme (mandatory), media in one-to-one chats, encrypted groups, live location, places and moments in chat, and vault files. Web calls are end-to-end encrypted when everyone involved supports it; in the app this is still rolling out in stages. Not end-to-end encrypted: public content, posts to friends (encryption built, not switched on yet), metadata, call captions, live streams and groups that were never encrypted.
Which methods are used?
For one-to-one chats: key exchange with X25519 and ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203, a post-quantum method) as a hybrid, combined with HKDF-SHA256, content encrypted with AES-256-GCM. For media, places, moments, live location and vault the keys are wrapped on the same principle (SHA3-256 combiner); moving to a new device adds ML-KEM-1024. Between the browser and our front server, the website connection uses TLS 1.3 with X25519MLKEM768 (older browsers: X25519).
What does "hybrid" mean?
A classical method (X25519) and a post-quantum method (ML-KEM-768) are combined, in case one of them is broken later. It is an extra safety margin; we do not promise protection against every conceivable future attack.
What does the server see despite encryption?
Sender, recipient, time and size of messages; for calls, participants, duration and room. Call captions pass through the server in plain text. Posts to friends and public content are readable. Further limits are listed in the section "Known limits".
Where are the servers?
According to the privacy policy, web hosting, database and e-mail are run by php-friends GmbH (Germany). The media, storage and routing server is operated by netcup GmbH in its Nuremberg data centre.
Has the encryption been audited independently?
No. There has been no independent audit of the encryption so far.
How are passwords stored?
Not in plain text but as a hash (Argon2id, partly with an additional secret server value). Older bcrypt hashes are converted at the next login.
How do I report a security vulnerability?
Via the form at https://friendsti.me/sicherheit-melden.php, no account needed.